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In political philosophy one often encounters claims on behalf of pluralism, yet there 
is anything but a consensus over the meaning of this fundamental concept. It is 
true that there is no single pluralist tradition; rather, there are different pluralist 
traditions within different domains of practical reason. No one would object, 
however, to the notion that Isaiah Berlin’s “value pluralism” is a genuine form of 
meta-ethical pluralism. Charles Taylor is another philosopher who is often called a 
pluralist, but I shall argue that this is a mistake. One of the central goals of his 
philosophy is that of reconciling competing aims and ends and this is incompatible 
with pluralism. 
It goes without saying that moral pluralism is a protean subject. 
However, it is generally agreed in the history of ideas that the concept 
of value pluralism was introduced by Isaiah Berlin1. It is true that the 
______________ 
* The author is an M.A. student in political science (Université de Montréal). 
An earlier draft of this essay was presented at a seminar at the Centre de 
Recherche en Éthique (CRÉ), Montréal, in January 2015. The author would 
like to thank the members of the CRÉ and two anonymous reviewers from 
Ithaque for challenging and helpful comments on the text. Finally, the author 
wishes to recognize a special debt owed to Charles Blattberg and Robert 
Sparling for critical remarks and valuable advice. 
1 Although the idea of unavoidable conflicts between equally valid ends is 
present in the work of thinkers such as William James, Max Weber or John 
Dewey, Berlin is probably the first philosopher to explore the meanings and 
implications of moral pluralism from a meta-ethical point of view. Cf. “The 
conflict of ideals” in James, W. (1897), The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, p. 198-205; for the irreducible opposition between liberty 
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development of this notion is simultaneous with the ideal of negative 
liberty2, namely that conception of individual freedom that entails a 
sphere of activity that must be free from the deliberate interference 
of other human beings. This evidently contrasts with positive liberty 
and its emphasis on the notion of autonomy; in this sense, agents are 
free when each acts according to his or her own will. The positive 
construal of liberty is associated with the ideal of “self-mastery”, 
according to which human reason can be divided into a superior, 
higher, dominant self on the one hand, and a lower, dominated and 
thus heteronomous self on the other3. For Berlin, this contrast 
between the rational and irrational aspects of the self lends legitimacy 
to a potential source of subjection and oppression to those who 
would not be able to see what is good and right – after all, according 
to Rousseau4, “[o]ne always desires one’s own good, but one does not 
always see what it is5”. Hence, society reserves the right to force every 
citizen to be free insofar as its social contract contains an “implicit 
obligation which alone can give force to the others, that if anyone 
refuses to obey the general will he will be compelled to do so by the 
whole body6”. That is why Berlin works to defend negative liberty, 
                                                                                                    
and rationality in Weber’s thought, see “Politics as a Vocation” in Weber, M. 
(1948), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, p. 77-128; and “John Dewey and 
the Roots of Political Pluralism” in Eisenberg, A. (1995), Reconstructing 
Political Pluralism, p. 27-54. See also “Historical Inevitability” in Berlin, I. 
(2002), Liberty, esp. p. 151: “if we can understand how conflicts between 
ends equally ultimate and sacred, but irreconcilable within the breast of even 
a single human being, or between different men or groups, can lead to tragic 
and unavoidable collisions, we shall not distort the moral facts by artificially 
ordering them in terms of some one absolute criterion”. 
2 For a discussion on negative liberty, see Berlin, I. (2002), “Two Concepts 
of Liberty”, esp. p. 216: “Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty 
that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of 
those who seek in the great disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 
‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind”.  
3 Cf. Berlin, I. (2002), “Two Concepts of Liberty”, p. 179. 
4 It is worth pointing out that Berlin traces the positive construal of liberty 
back to Rousseau. Cf. Ibid., p. 183, 185, 191 and 194. See also Berlin, I. 
(2002), Freedom and its Betrayal, p. 27-49.  
5 Rousseau, J.-J. (1994), The Social Contract, II, 3, p. 66.  
6 Ibid., I, 7, p. 58.  
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since he believes that it is better able to ensure moral pluralism — 
unlike its positive version, which encourages a particular conception 
of the common good.  
Charles Taylor has criticized Berlin’s distinction7 not only for it 
simplistic and somewhat Manichean character, but also because a 
stubborn commitment to negative liberty encourages what he calls a 
“Maginot Line mentality8”. To stand on this line, he argues, is to 
declare all self-realization views to be “metaphysical hogwash” and by 
implication, to uphold a purely Hobbesian definition of freedom, one 
according to which liberty is understood exclusively as the absence of 
external barriers9. Moreover, as Taylor has put it, this conception of 
freedom proves to be untenable from a practical point of view: it 
ignores an irreducible dimension of human experience from which 
individuals understand that there exists, regardless of their own will, a 
“pre-existing horizon of significance, whereby some things are 
worthwhile and others less so, and still others not at all […]10”. 
Taylor’s reformulation of the problem, which separates negative and 
positive conceptions of freedom is certainly well known; it is 
nevertheless worthwhile to recall the main point that emerges from 
his argument: the negative conception fails to establish a fundamental 
distinction between “opportunity” and “exercise” concepts of 
freedom11. Indeed, Berlin’s dichotomy asserts an analytical gap 
between the conditions for the possibility of freedom and the 
______________ 
7 See Taylor, C. (1985), “What’s wrong with negative liberty”. It is 
worthwhile noting that many political theorists are opposed to Berlin’s 
distinction. Cf. amongst others, Spitz, J.-F. (1995), La Liberté Politique : Essai 
de Généalogie Conceptuelle, p. 97-121; see also Philip Pettit and his conception 
of freedom as non-domination in Pettit, P. (1997), Republicanism: A Theory of 
Freedom And Government, p. 19: “I believe that these philosophical and 
historical oppositions are misconceived and misleading and, in particular, 
that they conceal from view the philosophical validity and historical reality 
of a third, radically different way of understanding freedom […]: the 
republican tradition”.  
8 Taylor, C. (1985), “What’s wrong with negative liberty”, p. 215. 
9 Ibid., p. 214. 
10 Taylor, C. (1991), The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 38.  
11 Taylor, C. (1985), “What’s wrong with negative liberty”, p. 229; See also 
Mulhall, S. (2004), “Articulating the Horizons of Liberalism: Taylor’s 
Political Philosophy”, p. 108-109. 
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effective realization of this freedom. In other words, as soon as the 
problem of freedom is contextualized, Taylor believes that it is 
possible to understand how we – “strong evaluators12” – are led to 
make moral judgements. The problem of freedom, then, should be 
seen as a matter of knowing whether and how we can determine the 
importance of our different ends or purposes.  
This contrast between Berlin and Taylor as regards the question 
of liberty is well known. In the following pages, my aim will be to 
further develop it by introducing a new theme: one concerned with 
their respective conceptions of value pluralism. My main goal will be 
to question the assumption, taken for granted by many scholars of 
political philosophy – indeed perhaps even by Taylor himself – that 
Taylor’s approach to morals and politics is pluralist. For, while the 
recognition of a non-formalized plurality of human goods plays a 
fundamental role in Taylor’s moral philosophy, there nevertheless is 
an important difference between his desire to find a way to 
harmonize the various purposes and ends to which individuals and 
communities aspire, on the one hand, and the quintessentially value 
pluralist assertion that these purposes and ends are often 
irreconcilable with each other, on the other. My investigation begins 
with an account of the short exchange between Berlin and Taylor13, 
one which highlights two radically divergent approaches to practical 
reason, especially in the light of what is sometimes called the problem 
of “dirty hands14”. Against the prevailing interpretation, I will argue 
that Charles Taylor is simply not a pluralist; indeed, to uphold a 
position that seeks to avoid moral dilemmas from a practical 
standpoint is to strive to reconcile competing aims and ends. Finally, 
I will proceed to illustrate the manner in which Taylor’s moral 
philosophy can even be characterized as “monist”. In the final 
section, I will devote significant attention to the implications he 
brings to dismiss the problem of dirty hands.  
______________ 
12 See Taylor, C. (1985), “What is human agency?”. The notion of “strong 
evaluation” is crucial to understanding Taylor’s work – its practical 
implications will be analysed in the following sections.  
13 See Berlin, I. (1994), “Introduction”, p. 1-3; and Taylor, C. (1994), 
“Charles Taylor replies”, p. 213-214. 
14 Cf. Walzer, M. (1973), “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, 
p. 160-180. See also Blattberg, C. (2013), “Dirty Hands”, p. 1366-1372. 
What’s wrong with Charles Taylor’s moral pluralism 
  25 
1. Incommensurability and conflicts of values: how Berlin read 
Machiavelli 
One of the best ways to understand Berlin’s moral pluralism is to 
focus on the thoughts he expressed regarding Machiavelli15. Needless 
to say, the opposition between paganism and Christianity, brilliantly 
highlighted by the Florentine, proved to be a real dagger in the heart 
of the natural law tradition16. According to Berlin’s interpretation, 
Machiavelli’s rupture with the whole tradition of classical political 
philosophy brought to light the incompatibility between two 
concurrent moral universes – the wisdom of the Ancients and the 
weakness of the Moderns. Now it makes sense to focus on the theme 
of value conflicts in the work of Machiavelli in so far as we pay 
attention to the moral problem with which Berlin has been 
concerned – namely, the gap between an ideal standard of action and 
reality in practice. Drawing on this, we must respond to the famous 
objection of Leo Strauss, according to which the substance of 
Machiavelli’s political teaching regards “the essential inherence of 
immorality in the foundation of society and hence in the structure of 
society17”. Against Strauss’ frustratingly bleak tableau, Berlin argues 
that Machiavelli’s line of demarcation does not correspond to a 
boundary between specifically moral values and specifically political 
values. Indeed, Berlin tries to show how the differentiation has rather 
more to do with two distinct ethical systems: “what [Machiavelli] 
achieves is not the emancipation of politics from ethics or religion 
[…]; what he institutes is something that cuts deeper still – a 
differentiation between two incompatible ideals of life, and therefore 
______________ 
15 See Berlin, I. (1980), “The Originality of Machiavelli”. It is relevant to 
note that Berlin traces the origin of the idea of value pluralism to the 
German Romantics and to Machiavelli, in opposition to what he depicts as a 
mainstream Western rationalist tradition and whose main thinkers are 
Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx. Cf. Berlin, I. (1999), The Roots of 
Romanticism, p. 21-34. See also Riley, J. (2013), ‘‘Isaiah Berlin’s 'Minimum of 
Common Moral Ground'’’, p. 63-67.  
16 Such is, at least, the reading Berlin shares with Leo Strauss. Cf. Strauss, L. 
(1959), What is Political Philosophy? p. 40-50; see also Strauss, L. (1958), 
Thoughts on Machiavelli. 
17 Strauss, L. (1959), What is Political Philosophy?, p. 44.  
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two moralities18”. The parallel lays out the inevitably tragic character 
that accompanies any position in favour of one or another sets of 
values, because the choice made between these two forms of life will 
fundamentally be radical19.  
If Machiavelli attributes the cause of “infinite inconveniences and 
infinite disorders” to the Church, it is because, in his opinion, “it has 
not been so powerful nor of such virtue as to be able to seize the 
tyranny of Italy and make itself prince of it20”. The affirmation of a 
consequentialist common good is made manifest in the myriad 
examples of Roman society to which the Florentine refers readers, as 
its aim is to show, inter alia, that the Christian moral ideal is 
ineffective in practice. Berlin argues that what matters most, for 
Machiavelli, is that the morality of the pagan world was somehow a 
socially necessary instrument – but not, however, morally superior – as 
it should be able to foster respect and fear of God among citizens21. 
Moreover, it is in his description of the pagan religion that the notion 
of verità effettuale makes perfect sense, as it is obvious that Machiavelli 
rejects the Christian ideal from a purely consequentialist perspective. 
Thus, to the extent that the morality of the Christian world inevitably 
leads the Republic to powerlessness and to political inefficiency, 
Machiavelli makes the “radical choice22” of embracing an “effective 
______________ 
18 Berlin, I. (1980), “The Originality of Machiavelli”, p. 45. The essential 
values of the morality of the pagan world are “courage, vigour, fortitude in 
adversity, public achievement, order, discipline, happiness, strength, justice, 
above all assertion of one’s proper claims and the knowledge and power 
needed to secure their satisfaction […]”. Against this moral universe, the ideals 
of Christianity are “charity, mercy, sacrifice, love of God, forgiveness of 
enemies, contempt for the goods of this world, faith in the life hereafter, belief 
in the salvation of the individual soul as being of incomparable value – higher 
than, indeed wholly incommensurable with, any social or political or other 
terrestrial goal, any economic or military or aesthetic consideration”.  
19 Berlin, I. (1980), “The Originality of Machiavelli”, p. 66.  
20 Machiavelli, N. (2009), Discourses on Livy, I, XII, p. 38.  
21 Ibid., I, XI, p. 34-35: “Whoever considers well the Roman histories sees 
how much religion served to command armies, to animate the plebs, to keep 
men good, to bring shame to the wicked”.  
22 The notion of radical choice is central to my analysis – I will, of course, 
develop it further in the following pages. For the moment, suffice it to say 
that what I mean by radical choice is the decision of an individual to give 
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truth” which, having passed the test of experience is better able to 
account for the instability of worldly things23.  
There can be little doubt that the concerns raised by Machiavelli 
proved to be eminently pragmatic. At first sight, the links with the 
question of moral dilemmas may seem strange; insofar as the set of 
values chosen by the Florentine is justified by facts – that is, by what 
history has taught us –, one might wonder if it is indeed a radical 
choice. Yet, it is important for us to recognize the gap observed by 
Berlin between the two aforementioned moral universes: Berlin’s 
interpretation places emphasis on the incompatible values such as 
described by Machiavelli; it follows from this that it is impossible to 
reconcile these two ends or purposes, because the use of an absolute 
and unquestionable fulcrum – such as a transcendent order of 
justice – that would legitimize a certain standard of morality is simply 
unworkable in practice. According to Berlin, Machiavelli believes that 
justice is the result of a painful choice made by individuals living in a 
sublunary sphere, as Aristotle would say, that is, in a world subject to 
physical changes. However, in such a world, there is no room for the 
idea of an intelligible harmony designed with absolute certainty 
regarding the existence of one supreme human purpose: 
“Machiavelli’s cardinal achievement is […] his uncovering of an 
absolute dilemma, the planting of a permanent question mark in the 
path of posterity24”.  
2. Berlin’s argument 
In a festschrift published in honour of Charles Taylor, Berlin begins 
the discussion on a fundamentally critical tone: 
                                                                                                    
preference to one possibility, and therefore automatically exclude all other 
possibilities; the fundamental evaluation whereby the agent bases his or her 
decision cannot be grounded in any form of rationality. In other words, the 
justification for a radical choice that entails the comparison of 
incommensurable reasons for action cannot be determined theoretically. See 
Taylor, C. (1985), “What is human agency?”, p. 29-35.  
23 Berlin, I. (1980), “The Originality of Machiavelli”, p. 46-47.  
24 Ibid., p. 74. It is worth noting that Aristotle, who is a monist, would agree 
with neither Berlin nor Machiavelli. 
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Charles Taylor […] is basically a teleologist – both as a 
Christian and as a Hegelian. He truly believes, as so many 
in the history of thought have done and still do, that 
human beings, and perhaps the entire universe, have a 
basic purpose […]. Consequently, everything that he has 
written is concerned with what people have believed, 
striven after, developed into, lived in the light of, and, 
finally, the ultimate goals towards which human beings as 
such are by their very natures determined to move25. 
Berlin’s argument brings forward two essential points regarding 
Taylor’s thought that, in his opinion, are incompatible with moral 
pluralism: first, there is his teleological approach, which involves the 
assignment of a certain direction – be it spiritual or secular – to 
human affairs. Second, even if Taylor seems to be aware that is it not 
feasible – nor even desirable – to determine one and only one 
conceivable course of action for the whole of humankind, he argues 
that it is however possible to reconcile competing aims and ends. 
Berlin attributes much of these limits of Taylor’s thought to the fact 
that he remains under the influence of Herder, for whom different 
cultures and societies are supposedly driven by an inherent organic 
structure26. Berlin, who was strongly influenced by philosophers like 
Spinoza and Hume, rather than Herder, boldly asserts that purposes 
are “imposed by human beings upon nature and the world, rather 
than pursued by them as part of their own central natures or 
essences27”. It is clear that one significant reason for the distance 
Berlin places between himself and Herder is the atomistic ontology 
that characterizes the former’s approach to morals and politics28. 
However, as we know, Herder was concerned with cultural diversity, 
while acknowledging and defending the fundamental value of the 
individual as well29. What we must remember, in short, is that Berlin 
______________ 
25 Berlin, I., (1994), “Introduction”, p. 1. 
26 Ibid., p. 2.  
27 Ibid. 
28 See Blattberg, C. (2000), From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Pratice First, 
p. 4, 75-76 & 126.  
29 Such is, at least, Louis Dumont’s interpretation of Herder. Cf. Dumont, L. 
(1983), Essais sur l’Individualisme, p. 119.  
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rejects the idea – which he considers to be central to Taylor’s 
thought – of a causal structure that could determine the development 
of different communities and individuals in an inexorable march 
towards a single, predestined goal30.  
Now we are drawn to expound Berlin’s main concerns about the 
practical implications of Taylor’s guiding ideas regarding moral 
pluralism. If we take his objections seriously, it becomes clear that the 
agent who has to compare incommensurables – that is to say, who 
must determine his action vis-à-vis a plurality of non-formalized 
purposes or concerns justified on grounds of membership, 
attachments or any other reason – will be facing values that prove 
morally indefensible in terms of a “common good”. In fact, what 
worries Berlin is that Taylor seems to acknowledge that there is an 
essential direction, as it were, whose function is to weigh claims and 
principles against one another with the aim of establishing an order 
of priority. It is then clear that, for Taylor, in so far as individual 
evaluations are ultimately expected to converge towards a common 
goal – this vision of “a human society acting in a harmonious and 
interactive fashion” – they are therefore not the result of a radical 
choice31. Our modern identities’ fate, the claims goes, is to embrace 
the discovery according to which it is possible to eliminate genuine 
moral dilemmas, if only our authenticity and our rational conclusions 
were met in practice. 
Unfortunately, Berlin’s argument – which, it must be said, is really 
a mere draft – does not go into further details about the possible 
criticisms regarding the implications of Taylor’s thought on moral 
pluralism. It is as though Taylor were obviously in no way ready to 
accept the crucial observation that inspired the entire career of the 
historian of ideas: 
the notion of one world, one humanity moving in one 
single march of the faithful, laeti triumphantes, is unreal. The 
incompatibility of equally valid ideals in different societies 
at different periods, and of the various values and ends of 
individual human beings of whom these societies are 
composed – these and these alone, not a cosmic plan, 
______________ 




determine what the total outcome of human behaviour 
must be, even if the individuals cannot themselves tell 
what the result of these interacting activities will turn out 
to be32. 
3. Taylor’s response 
Admittedly, it may be asked whether Berlin’s argument sketched 
above rigorously applies to Taylor’s position with respect to moral 
pluralism. As a matter of fact, Berlin never considered himself a 
moral philosopher and the lack of analytical precision in his writing 
does not help matters either. Thus, before examining the issue before 
us in the previous works of Charles Taylor, I think it would be wise 
to pay attention to his own response to the criticisms addressed by 
Berlin.  
First, it is interesting to note that Taylor recognizes that he is not 
sure the gap between them is as wide as it seems in Berlin’s 
description33. Of course, against the charge of teleology, Taylor 
argues that their disagreement is rather due to theological than 
practical differences34. That being said, the question of Catholic 
influence on his thought has not only been discussed many times 
elsewhere35, but I think it can be conceived in isolation from the 
problem of dirty hands. In addition, Taylor emphasizes the fact that 
we are often faced with irreconcilable conflicts between seemingly 
incompatible ways of life; he goes on, moreover, to challenge what he 
calls “pseudo-solutions”, that is to say, simplistic philosophical 
positions that tend to derive our obligations and purposes from a 
single principle36. His criticism is aptly addressed to those “radically 
monistic” ethical currents of thought according to which moral 
______________ 
32 Berlin, I., (1994), “Introduction”, p. 3.  
33 Taylor, C., (1994), “Charles Taylor replies”, p. 213.  
34 Ibid. 
35 See Fraser, I. (2005), “Charles Taylor’s Catholicism”; Abbey, R. (2006), 
« Turning or Spinning ? Charles Taylor’s Catholicism: A Reply to Ian 
Fraser » ; and Fraser, I. (2007), Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor. 
36 Taylor, C. (1994), “Charles Taylor replies”, p. 213. Taylor certainly had in 
mind utilitarianism – it is important to recall his fierce critique in Taylor, C. 
(1985), “The Diversity of Goods”.  
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conflicts should be avoided at all costs – hence their use of an 
axiomatic of rational decision37. Taylor is, then, well aware that it is 
difficult to reconcile divergent values such as freedom, respect for 
human rights, environmental protection and acceptance of cultural 
diversity38. It is evident that seeking to reach a compromise on one 
given path goes hand in hand with possible compromises on other 
ones, because it is not possible to find a total solution to reconcile a 
priori value conflicts. However, a closer look reveals that Taylor sees 
himself between radical monism and Berlin’s moral pluralism: 
I am reluctant to take this as the last word. I still believe 
that we can and should struggle for a ‘transvaluation’ (to 
borrow Nietzsche’s term Umwertung) which could open the 
way to a mode of life, individual and social, in which these 
demands could be reconciled39. 
This then means that, for Taylor, Berlin’s moral pluralism is such 
a radical approach as utilitarianism, for it is not compatible with 
conceiving of moral dilemmas as surmountable40. But this claim, I 
want to argue, reveals an incoherence at the very heart of Taylor’s 
ostensive pluralism, because a moral dilemma is insurmountable by 
definition – indeed, there is a contradiction in Taylor’s thinking if the 
agent facing a moral dilemma has also the means to resolve it. 
Furthermore, Taylor’s insistence on reconciliation of once opposing 
incommensurable goods fails to take the pluralist’s presumption that 
tragic conflict between ultimate reasons for action is unavoidable 
seriously enough. In practical terms, to resolve a conflict of values, 
the agent will inevitably have to face confrontation and compromise, 
if only to establish a hierarchical opposition between the values at 
hand, and hence artificially rank them – therefore, we could say that 
the agent is, so to speak, already willing to get his or her hands dirty.  
______________ 
37 We can think of philosophers such as Peter Singer or Philip Pettit who 
have “discovered” quasi-algebraic formulae to solve all moral problems they 
encounter – sentience and non-domination, respectively.  
38 Taylor, C. (1994), “Charles Taylor replies”, p. 213-214. 
39 Ibid., p. 214.  
40 Ibid.  
Didier Zúñiga 
 32 
4. The problem of “dirty hands” 
Jean-Paul Sartre famously articulated the problem of dirty hands 
in a play where the idealism of Hugo, a young bourgeois intellectual, 
is confronted with Hœderer’s – one of the communist leaders –
 pragmatism. When faced with the apparent naivety of Hugo, Hœderer 
objects on a glorious tone: 
[h]ow you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you 
are to soil your hands! All right, stay pure! What good will 
it do? Why did you join us? Purity is an idea for a yogi or a 
monk. You intellectuals and bourgeois anarchists use it as 
a pretext for doing nothing. To do nothing, to remain 
motionless, arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, I 
have dirty hands. Right up to the elbows. I’ve plunged 
them in filth and blood. But what do you hope? Do you 
think you can govern innocently41? 
Sartre is mostly interested in the issue of political action, namely 
the procedures and modalities for fair and equitable action, given the 
circumstances. However, in the absence of a transcendent criterion of 
justice, the very meaning of dirty hands must refer to a moral 
dilemma, given the conflict that occurs between, for instance, 
political goals A and B – because we can only target one at the 
expense of the other. Just consider values such as freedom and 
equality – as Berlin has put it, “total liberty for wolves is death to the 
lambs, total liberty of the powerful, the gifted, is not compatible with 
the rights to a decent existence of the weak and the less gifted42”. 
Given what has been said above, it becomes evident that when 
equality demands a restraint of liberty – and vice versa – we fall into a 
dilemma: there cannot be any effort whatsoever of rationalization 
that could be capable, for example, of systematizing different 
premises, that is to say reducing them to a few principles whose 
priority order would be obvious. We can approach the problem with 
another passage from Sartre, also quoted in Charles Taylor’s work, to 
illustrate the concept of responsibility with regard to moral 
______________ 
41 Sartre, J.-P. (1989), No Exit and Three Other Plays, p. 218.  
42 Berlin, I. (1990), “The pursuit of the ideal”, p. 12.  
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evaluations43. It is, of course, the example of the young man who is 
torn between two competing interests and the compromising balance 
that needs to be struck between them: his brother was in fact killed 
during the German offensive of 1940, so he wanted to join the Forces 
Françaises Libres to avenge him and fight the rise of Nazism. On the 
other hand, his ailing mother lived with him and the young man was 
aware that his death in combat would plunge her into terrible sorrow. 
Sartre’s thesis is that there is no basis for a line of reasoning to be 
applied in order to compare – let alone reconcile or arbitrate – the 
two competing moral allegiances: the young man “has to settle the 
question, whichever way he goes, by radical choice44”.  
Yet, Taylor does not share Sartre’s portrayal of the dilemma; 
according to him, we see a grievous moral dilemma because of 
Sartre’s simplistic and instrumental conception of the young man’s 
“contrastive language” – that is to say, the language in which he is 
able to express a preference between incommensurables, or, in other 
words, what leads him to call one alternative higher or more worthy 
than another one45. Taylor’s argument, it seems to me, is essentially as 
follows. There is a way of understanding “human agency” in light of 
evaluations that involve a qualitative distinction of desires – hence the 
notion of “strong evaluation46”. A strong evaluator is an agent who 
has the capacity for reflective self-evaluation, and so he or she is able 
to form second-order desires. Put in other terms, the agent who 
examines a practical situation relies on a contrastive language that 
allows him or her to express qualitative distinctions. As Taylor has 
put it, “we think of (at least higher) animals as having desires, even as 
having to choose between desires in some cases, or at least as 
inhibiting some desires for the sake of others. But what is 
distinctively human is the power to evaluate our desires, to regard 
some as desirable and other as undesirable47”. The strong evaluator 
envisages his alternatives through a “vocabulary of worth”, and, in 
doing so, he articulates a “qualitative characterization of desires as 
higher and lower, noble and base, courageous and cowardly, 
______________ 
43 Taylor, C. (1985), “What is human agency?”, p. 29.  
44 Ibid., p. 29.  
45 Ibid., p. 31-32. 
46 Ibid., p. 18.  
47 Ibid., p. 15-16.  
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integrated and fragmented, and so on48”. The strong evaluator is 
thereby able to establish the superiority of one alternative over the 
others; so within an experience of reflective choice over 
incommensurables, the agent initiates a process of reflection on his or 
her own preferences with reference to a background of meaning that 
stems from traditions and interpretations49. For Taylor, this 
phenomenological account of identity is constitutive of the 
“transcendental conditions” of the human being; what makes us truly 
human, according to him, is that we are capable of articulating our 
preferences in terms of qualitative distinctions, not just applying 
cost / benefit considerations50. Continuing with Sartre’s hypothetical 
case, Taylor believes that the young man portrayed as acting in virtue 
of radical choice is not a “strong evaluator”, but rather a “simple 
weigher” – for “all his putative strong evaluations issue from simple 
weighings51”. Indeed, according to Taylor, if the agent’s preference 
does not depend on the application of a contrastive language, the 
radical choice appears to be purely arbitrary – which “brings us to the 
limit where choice fades into non-choice52”. As far as the practical 
consequences of the subject’s judgement, his or her opinion must 
necessarily be based on principle to determine the desirability and 
importance of commitments. Otherwise put, in keeping with Taylor’s 
understanding of choice – whether radical or not – one cannot be 
satisfied under any circumstances with unintentional criteria. 
Consequently, even radical choice depends in some way on an 
assessment that should ultimately determine why the agent is leaning 
more one way than to the other. And that is why Taylor thinks that 
the “theory of radical choice” is inconsistent ; its advocates are aware 
that such a choice requires an evaluation based on practical 
consequences, but they are not willing, however, to recognize their 
status as moral judgements: 
[e]ither we take seriously the kinds of considerations which 
weigh in our moral decisions, and then we are forced to 
______________ 
48 Taylor, C. (1985), “What is human agency?”, p. 24.  
49 Ibid., p. 24. 
50 See Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of The Self, p. 32.  
51 Taylor, C. (1985), “What is human agency?”, p. 31.  
52 Ibid.  
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recognize that these are for the most part evaluations 
which do not issue from radical choice; or else we try at all 
costs to keep our radical choice independent of any such 
evaluations, but then it ceases to be a choice of strong 
evaluations, and becomes a simple expression of 
preference, and if we go farther and try to make it 
independent even of our de facto preferences, then we fall 
ultimately into a criteria-less leap which can not properly 
be described as choice at all53. 
It is important to note that, for Taylor, moral judgements are 
unified and rendered coherent by our acknowledgement of an 
architectonic source of ultimate value, namely “hypergoods54”. These 
goods are at the foundation of our moral judgements, that is to say, it 
is through their pursuit that we become able to articulate qualitative 
distinctions between different values: “higher-order goods of this 
kind […] not only are incomparably more important than others but 
provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, 
decided about55”. It is, as it were, a line of reasoning that exists 
independently of each individual will and according to which persons 
succeed in establishing the importance of their choices. That is not to 
say that the process of squaring off different competing ends 
necessarily entails smooth decisions. There is a sense, of course, in 
which “hypergoods”, as Taylor defines them, can be a potential 
source of conflict since the highest, architectonic good can call for 
the supersession of less adequate goods outright56. In illustrating this 
position, Taylor uses the example of the notion of universal justice as 
part of a moral framework that arose through a historical negation of 
earlier hierarchical conceptions of society57. At this point, one could 
argue that the very recognition of a “hypergood” cannot but dirty our 
hands; as Taylor concedes, it is a source of “often grievous dilemmas 
in moral life58”. Yet Taylor fails to appreciate the extent to which 
______________ 
53 Taylor, C. (1985), “What is human agency?”, p. 33. 
54 Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of The Self, p. 62-75.  
55 Ibid., p. 63.  
56 See Ibid., p. 64-66.  
57 Ibid., p. 65. 
58 Ibid., p. 65.  
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moral conflicts can result in genuine tragedy, and that irreparable loss 
is sometimes unavoidable. Indeed, he still believes that, by the 
interpretive form of practical reason, one which aims to establish 
“that some position is superior to some other”, it is possible to 
reconcile hypergood-driven conflicts59. In Sources of the Self, he writes: 
greater lucidity can help us to see our way to a 
reconciliation. If I may give expression to an even farther-
out hunch, I will say that I see this as the potential goal 
and fruit of articulacy. We have to search for a way in 
which our strongest aspirations towards hypergoods do 
not exact a price of self-mutilation. I believe that such a 
reconciliation is possible60.  
That is why, according to Taylor, by way of a foray into language 
and meaning, one can go on and “rationally assess” definitions of 
worth because “there is, at least in principle”, a way in which such 
conflicts can be arbitrated61. Certainly, returning to the example of 
Sartre’s young man, it is clear that Taylor does not believe that the 
agent’s choice is obvious a priori. Taylor is aware that the young man 
must be prepared to make a disconcerting moral judgement on his 
own action, but “unless some options are more significant than 
others, the very idea of self-choice falls into triviality and hence 
incoherence62”. Taylor’s conception of strong evaluation as an 
essential condition of articulacy entails that the justification of value 
judgements becomes virtually impossible in the absence of “a 
horizon of issues of importance63”. But when it comes to the 
conflicts between ultimate sources of value, whether those sources 
are defined narrowly as reasons for action, or more broadly as 
“hypergoods”, my claim is that the path to articulacy cannot cope 
with tragic loss. Although Taylor agrees that there are a variety of 
______________ 
59 Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of The Self, p. 72-75. See also Blattberg, C. (2009), 
Patriotic Elaborations: Essays in Practical Philosophy, p. 134. 
60 Ibid., p. 106-107. 
61 Cf. Introduction to Taylor, C. (1985), Human Agency And Language: 
Philosophical Papers I, p. 12.  
62 Taylor, C. (1991), The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 39. 
63 Ibid., p. 39. 
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valuable ideals, pursuits, and aspirations for which human beings 
yearn, he appears to miss the practical implications of normative 
pluralism. In fact, in Sartre’s example, Taylor never decides the issue 
of the student’s authentic purpose, but his argument aims to show 
the lack of criteria available to the reader so as to define the agent’s 
standards of value. In the presence of this horizon of issues of 
importance that defines “the respects in which self-making is 
significant64”, the strong evaluator’s radical choice is untenable: he is 
therefore not facing a moral dilemma, and Sartre’s student – whatever 
his choice is – will not get dirty hands. 
5. Value pluralism and moral dilemmas 
Rereading Berlin’s criticism in light of the problem of dirty hands, 
it is difficult not to acknowledge the large gap between the latter’s 
understanding of moral pluralism and Charles Taylor’s. Unlike 
Berlin’s assertion, according to which pluralism concerns the duties 
that lead to moral dilemmas, Taylor’s formula suggests that we 
should rather understand that we are caught in an inescapable 
network of hierarchical requirements that relegates to a lower status 
those matters that are likely to face a constant dilemma. There seems 
little doubt that one of the salient features of this disagreement is an 
ontological misunderstanding; while an individualistic atomism is 
manifest in Berlin’s thought, Charles Taylor extols a sense of 
solidarity among the different values that are present in a diverse 
society. Now, Taylor is probably right to accuse Berlin of retreating 
into a “Maginot Line” to defend at all costs the ideal of freedom as 
non-interference, because practical collisions necessarily stem from 
this atomistic conception of values65. That being said, Taylor’s holism 
cannot be exempt from all criticism; indeed, from a practical 
standpoint, the moral strength of the relationship among the different 
values that transcend the individuals’ mere particularity is, ultimately, 
the reflection of an implicit aspiration towards unity. Of course, 
Taylor is not defending a comprehensive version of liberalism that 
would seek, through politically oriented public policies, to inculcate 
the values it upholds to citizens who do not share them – we 
______________ 
64 Taylor, C. (1991), The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 40.  
65 See Blattberg, C. (2013), “Isaiah Berlin”, p. 524.  
Didier Zúñiga 
 38 
mentioned earlier his rejection of radical monism. However, while in 
berlinian pluralism the problem of dirty hands is insurmountable, 
the purpose of Taylor’s approach, by virtue of the moral horizon 
that functions as a background of intelligibility, is to reconcile what 
at first glance appeared to be a moral dilemma. All this amounts to 
defining a rationality specific to human beings (“strong evaluation”) 
according to which our aims, which are independent of our own 
desires – inclinations or choices – represent prescriptive standards 
to which the agent must comply66. 
One may wonder, however, if Berlin is right to read Machiavelli as 
a potential source of normative pluralism67. Based on Taylor’s 
reasoning, we could argue that as a strong evaluator, Machiavelli is 
seeking a moral ideal – i.e. the wisdom of the Ancients. Insofar as the 
Florentine defines his choice in accordance with a minimal horizon 
of significance, the fact that he radically rejects the Christian doctrine 
does not pose a moral dilemma per se68. The bottom line, here, is that 
Berlin wants us to acknowledge that Machiavelli completely 
abandons the idea of an ideal order that could guide us through 
systematically unified theories; in renouncing to this pretention of 
harmony, he made his readers aware that we sometimes have to 
make difficult – even agonizing — choices between incompatible 
purposes69: 
[a]nyone who believes in Christian morality, and regards 
the Christian commonwealth as its embodiment, but at the 
same time largely accepts the validity of Machiavelli’s 
political and psychological analysis and does not reject the 
______________ 
66 Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of The Self, p. 20.  
67 It is pertinent to note that Berlin does not tell us that Machiavelli is a 
pluralist. However, he is convinced that the Florentine significantly 
contributed to the development of moral pluralism. Berlin, I. (1980), “The 
Originality of Machiavelli”, p. 75: “I do not mean that Machiavelli explicitly 
asserts that there is a pluralism or even a dualism of values between which 
conscious choices must be made”; p. 79: “Yet he is, in spite of himself, one 
of the makers of pluralism […]”.  
68 We must recognize that Machiavelli abandons Christianity mainly because 
“the church has kept and keeps this province [Italy] divided”. Cf. 
Machiavelli, N. (2009), Discourses on Livy, I, XII, p. 38.  
69 Berlin, I. (1980), “The Originality of Machiavelli”, p. 79.  
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secular heritage of Rome […] is faced with a dilemma 
which, if Machiavelli is right, is not merely unsolved but 
insoluble70. 
It should be noted, in this regard, that pluralism goes beyond 
merely pointing out the multiplicity of manifestations of higher-order 
values and ideals. Pluralism, in Berlin’s sense, is based on the radical 
assumption that there is a plurality of ultimate sources of reasons for 
action, and that these sources are in constant peril of clashing. Thus, 
genuine moral dilemmas are intractable and inevitable; in fact, the 
problem arises in practice when the agent faces several possible 
descriptions of these horizons of significance, as Taylor would say, 
because the agent ultimately has to determine the relevance of his or 
her purposes and ends against a background of contingent criteria71. 
That is why, in a pluralist perspective, when the agent faces moral or 
political conflicts between different but equally valid arguments about 
what to do, which thus present the agent with tragic choices, there 
will always be a “moral remainder72”. Otherwise put, we will 
necessarily end up with dirty hands.  
6. Concluding remarks 
Let us conclude by saying that the constitutive paradox of 
moral pluralism – that is, that the problem of dirty hands is 
inescapable – entails rejecting Taylor’s approach to value conflicts 
and moral dilemmas. It is as if Taylor wanted to follow Berlin’s 
conception of conflict as the very basis of moral pluralism, but he 
is nevertheless not ready to assume all the consequences: Taylor 
argues that this horizon of significance – i.e., the background 
______________ 
70 Berlin, I. (1980), “The Originality of Machiavelli”, p. 77.  
71 The charge of relativism is a point that space does not permit me to 
elaborate on here, but it is evident that critics may claim that pluralism 
lowers the standards of social action. This might be true. It could be argued, 
however, and as Víctor Muñiz-Fraticelli puts it, that “pluralism, as opposed 
to relativism, does not deny the objectivity of value across communities and 
cultures”. Cf. Muñiz-Fraticelli, V. (2014), The Structure of Pluralism, note 19, 
p. 15. See also Jahanbegloo, R. (2013), Conversations with Isaiah Berlin.  
72 Williams, B. (1978), “Politics and Moral Character”, p. 63. 
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against which our desires, preference and reasons for action make 
sense – somehow enables individuals to overcome the inevitability 
of tragic conflict. Consequently, Taylor’s perspective rules out the 
possibility of irreparable loss, and as long as the agent is faithful to 
that transcending moral ideal, any compromise (or concession) 
that must be struck in response to a given conflict should be 
considered clean. 
It is important to acknowledge that this horizon of significance of 
which Taylor discusses does not constitute a discursively deduced 
reasoning from an indubitable first principle. On the contrary, the 
moral aspiration in question – the ideal of authenticity73 – takes issue 
with the anthropocentric nature of social atomism74, due to the fact 
that it neglects the particular and contingent relationship between our 
moral criteria and the social and historical conditions of their 
development. I agree with Taylor on his pertinent criticism of the 
absolute defense of negative liberty – and its resulting radical 
individualism – , as it is undoubtedly one of the ultimate sources of 
the imminent fragmentation of democratic societies. However, if I 
am right, we must recognize the incoherence of the hypothesis 
according to which Taylor’s approach to morals and politics is 
pluralist. To sum up, we should remember that pluralism not only 
posits the existence of a plurality of incommensurable moral sources 
that will inevitably conflict, but also claims that there is, at least 
sometimes, no way of resolving those conflicts because the goods 
involved are irreconcilable. Pluralism, then, opens the door to 
genuinely insoluble conflicts and hence to tragedy, since we cannot 
prioritize different human goods without getting dirty hands. Indeed, 
without access to a transcendent criterion allowing us to weigh values 
and purposes against each other, and as long as the agent must 
______________ 
73 Taylor, C. (1991), The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 25-30.  
74 In a well known article, Taylor argues that the term ‘atomism’ is used to 
characterize the “doctrines of social contract theory which arose in the 
seventeenth century and also successor doctrines which may not have made 
use of the notion of social contract but which inherited a vision of society as 
in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which 
were primarily individual”. Otherwise put, atomism is a view about human 
nature which asserts the “primacy of rights”. Cf. Taylor, C. (1985), 
“Atomism”, p. 187. 
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establish an abstract order of priority with the aim of distinguishing 
important — that is, what he or she cannot afford to neglect — from 
secondary, or trivial things, the agent will be facing radical choices 
between wholly incompatible interpretations. This does not mean 
that this choice will be arbitrary, in contrast to Taylor’s opinion, but 
radical in the sense that even if it is guided by a powerful and 
conventionally accepted moral ideal, the agent will still be weighing 
incompatible goods: thus, the agent will be de facto facing a genuine 
moral dilemma. 
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